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“IS THERE A COLLECTIVE MEMORY OF CRIME? 
REMEMBERING THE HOLOCAUST IN GERMANY 
FROM 1945 UNTIL TODAY.”
Ву Лпке HilbrennerIn Мау 2003 Nicolas Berg published his study “Der Holo- caust und die westdeutschen Historiker**1. In his study Berg explores the reasons why the Holocaust was marginalized in West German historiography for so long. Berg claims that many West German historians, while working deservingly about the history of National Socialism, they neglected its most central part, the Holocaust, as they were unwilling to accept the guilt of countloss Germans, including themselves or their fathers, brothers or teachers. Berg’s book was therefore percieved as an assault on the moral integrity of the West German historians, who devoted their studies to “Zeitgeschichte” (contemporary history) and up to this point had been considered a moral authority, because they were professionally dealing with “Vergangenheitsbewaltigung” (coming to terms with the past), which became a central factor of German identity.
1 Berg, Nicolas. Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker. Erfor- 
schung und Erinnerung. Gottingen 2003. The following discussion arose after 
the round table on the Kladovo transport, October 19th 2002, documented 
here. It illustrates my remarks well and is therefore included into this paper.
2 Frei, Norbert. Mitlaufergeschichten? Heute erscheint Nicolas Bergs 
Studie iiber die NS-Deutungen deutscher Zeithistoriker. In: Siiddeutsche Zei- 
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Starting with Norbcrt Frei’s review in the “Siiddeutsche Zeitung”, there arose a heated discussion about the book from the very same day it was published.2 The German feuilletons had a new “historians’ debate”.
Historians’ discourse on the Holocaust, on National Socia- lism and on the role of the historians in National Socialism, as well as coming to terms with the past, have been issues of the German public discourse since 1945.3 The “Historikerstreit” or the argument on the involvement of historians in National So- cialism, which is closely linked with the “Historikertag” in Frankfurt/Main 1998, are just two examples from the recent past. The fact has already been pointed out that those debates were to a large extend due to a generational conflict, the case of each historian being very much linked to his position in aca- demia and society.4 The arguments on the crucial points of Ger- man history were thus not merely put forward after a thorough- ly scientific process, but were formed by the sociological con- text of the historians involved.
3 Sabrow, Martin, Jessen, Ralph, GroRe Kracht, Klaus (HgJ. Zeitgeschi- 
chte als Streitgeschichte. GroRe Kontroversen seit 1945. Miinchen 2003.
4 See f.e. Leggewie, Claus. Mitleid mit den Doktorvatern oder 
Wissenschaftsgeschichte in Biographien. In: Merkur 53, 5 (1999) S. 433-444.
5 Kershaw, Ian. Beware the moral high ground. In: Times literary sup- 
plement, 10 October 2003.
Berg now stresses the point, that the methodological inno- vations of the “Zeithistoriker” such as the “structuralist appro- ach” to history was due to the historians' sociological context, their experiences of followers of National Socialism in their early years or their enrootment in a society of delinquents. The- ir way of exculpating individual perpetrators was to shift histo- rical interest to “processes” and structures. Jewish historians in retum, searching not for structures but for the perpetrators as their view was that of the victims, were marginalized by those “Zeithistoriker” out of their position of academic power.Berg’s opponents argue that he does not value the merits of the “Zeithistoriker”. Very often with a hint to close coopera- tion with the “Zeithistoriker” in question, those critics defend their colleagues as distinguished scientists and doubt Berg’s integrity: “Beware the moral high ground”5.
Berg’s book and probably unintendedly also the following discussion are case studies on the interaction between histori- ography and collective шетогу. The still valid positivist image of the historian implies objectivity and a strong opposition between historiography and collective тетогу. According to this image, the scientific approach to the past is more likely to show the relativity of one historical event or group in relation to another than, like collective тетогу, their exclusiveness and uniqueness. Historiography therefore deals with reality, while тетогу produces rather mystical narratives informed by the partisanship of the person or collective who remembers.But, as Amos Funkenstein holds against that, collective тетогу is informed by historical consciousness and “thinking about history reflected the moods and sentiments of the com- munity in which this thinking took place.”6 Derived from Fun- kenstein’s observation, I want to explore the Holocaust in Ger- man collectivc тетогу, taking the historical discourse into ac- count. In the course of time the attitude towards the Holocaust in German society has changed, but are there continuities as well? How are political and social needs of its contemporaries nitted into the web of collective тетогу? Is there a collective тетогу of delinquent?
6 Funkenstein, Amos: Perceptions of Jewish History, Berkeley and Los 
Angelos 1993. p. 8.
Being a contribution to a round table discussion, this pa- per cannot cover all sources and phenomena of collective mem- огу, neither in- nor excluding historiography. It is argumentati- ve rather than complete. But it is supposed to point out pro- blems of dealing with one’s past, especially with the тетогу of the Holocaust. It is fairly striking, I think, that the techniques of avoiding the тетогу of the Holocaust, while undergoing cer- tain changes in the course of time or within different political or social circumstances, still remain basically constant regar- ding important questions. The setting we find directly after the defeat of Germany and thus after the end of the Holocaust will reappear under different circumstances in different times from 1945 until today.
Victims and perpetrators after “Zero Hour”“Zero hour” is a common myth conceming Germany after the end of World War II. It is commonplace among historians and intellectuals that there was no “zero hour”, but in collecti- ve тетогу it still refers to a German restart in 1945. For the Germans, the date of Мау 8, 1945 was not a day of liberation, but one of defeat, of unconditional surrender. “Zero hour” im- plies the promise of looking ahead and not dealing with the past even though the past and its effects were undeniable. Confron- ted with their past in everyday life, Germans percieved themsel- ves as victims. More than 5 million Germans died in tjie war, 500 000 of those were civilians. Others were soldiers and left their families without fathers, brothers or sons. Another 1,5-2 million POWs7 were held especially in the Soviet Union and only a part of them retumed. The emotional loss of the remai- ning families was accompanied by lacking a bread-winner in economically difficult times. The fate of the remained and most- ly female society was left to the members of the occupying for- ces with varying results. Mass rape and abuse were frequent especially for the women in the Eastem part of Germany, were the Red Агту held power. The borđers between violation and prostitution because of economic and security reasons were streaming.8
7 Prisoners of war
8 See f.e. Апопута. Eine Frau in Berlin. Tagebuchaufzeichnungen vom 
20. April bis zum 22. Juni 1945. Frankfurt/Main 12003.
In most cities simple shelter was not available and the de- struction by the allied air raids would be visible for a long time. Very soon the fate of the “Volksdeutschen” added to their self- perception as victims. Almost 12 million of ethnic Germans were banished ffom Eastem Europe, тапу of them died. The others were refugees in a destroyed, ruined and needy country.
Under these circumstances the Germans regarded them- selves as victims. The Jewish suffering was, if mentioned at all, considered to be no greater than their own. The question of gu- ilt was avoided and this remained as such for a long time.9
9 Margalit, Gilad. Divided Метогу? Expressions of a United German 
Метогу. In: Michman, Dan (Hg.) Remembering the Holocaust in Germany, 
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31-42. R 32-33.
10 Meinecke, Friedrich. Die deutsche Katastrophe. Betrachtungen und 
Erinnerungen. Wiesbaden 1946.
11 Herf, Jeffrey. Devided тетогу: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanies. 
Cambridge, Mass. 1997.
The self-perception of the Germans as victims was not only common in the broader public but also in the intellectual disco- urse. Very telling for the case of the historians is Friedrich Mei- necke’s book “Die deutsche Katastrophe”, published in 1946.10 According to Meinecke, Nazism was something that happened to the Germans. He politically wrote against the identification of Nazism and Germany by the Allies, proving the “un-German” character of Nazism. Hitler and the Nazi elite had brought “ca- tastrophe” over the Germans, who were now suffering from the consequences. As those consequences there were identified: military defeat resulting in the loss of independent statehood of Germany, partitions of Germany and the loss of the East Euro- pean territories. The Holocaust was not considered. The perpe- trators were a small and vicous Nazi elite. Their very first vic- tims were the Germans themselves.
Victims and perpetrators in East and West GermanyThe German partition and the double and hostile state- hood of the two post-war Germanies added complexity to the question of the тетогу of the Holocaust in Germany, but was there realy a “divided тетогу”?11 Of course both Germanies 
remembered the Nazi past differently, but on the other hand we can trace down certain similarities conceming the question of guilt, of victims, and perpetrators.GDRThe GDR continued the German policy of perceiving them- selves as the “first victims” of National Socialism. In the focus of the official collective тетогу there were the communist fig- hters against fascism. The memorial sites in the GDR were stili- zed to become memorial sites of anti-fascism rather than the Holocaust. Those anti-fascist fighters were considered the foun- ding fathers of the GDR and the most of the members of the po- litical elite had themselves been victims of Nazi concentration camps or had fled from Nazi Germany. The “normal” Germans living in the GDR were considered to be victims as well, at least most of them: All Germans injured by the war, including Ger- man soldiers, were considered victims of fascism and war and thus belonged to the same category as the Jewish victims. This category counted for second rate victims in terms of preferen- tial pensions and social benefits, while the first place was awarded to the anti-fascist fighters. This policy of official com- memoration was due to the attempt of shaping an anti-fascist collective тетогу in order to legitimatize the new socialist Germany that had risen out of the ruins of destructed Hitler- Germany. It was also necessary to include the “normal” Ger- mans, to regard them as victims in order to build the bridges between the anti-fascist party oligarchy and the “normal”, most- ly non-communist Germans.With their official identity of “anti-fascist” Germany, the elites of the GDR felt no need to consider themselves or апу- body in their new state former perpetrators. The perpetrators were the “other” Germans in the FRG.As, according to Marxist theory, National Socialism was merely an extreme form of capitalism and imperialism, i.e. everything that was resembled by the West, the FRG together 
with its ncw vvestern partners was the legitimate heir of Nazi Germanv. 'l'hc GDR pointcd out to the continuities in the elites transforming from nazis to democrats in new \Vest Germany to prove its eligibilitv and thus showed that the 1 RG was really the countrv of delinquent, of the perpetrators of National Socialism, of the repressions against the Germans, of the war and not at last of thc Ilolocaust. Together vvith the FR.G nazis, their new wcstcrn partncrs bccame the target of GDR propaganda. Thus the GDR rencwed thc German bclicf, inherited from the time of the Third Rcich, that they vverc victimized by the VVestern Alli-
FRGIn West Germany the mvth of “Zcro Hour” remained alive for a long time. The official GDR policy was right with pointing out to former nazis in influential positions of the new democra- tic Germany, but politicians and society in the FRG wanted to look ahead. For the process of rebuilding the country they figu- red they were in need of the old elites and dealing too long with questions of guilt would not help.The establishment of the FRG continued with the empha- sis on German suffering during and after the war. The Germans remained victims and this perception was due to the anti-com- munist course of the FRG integration into the West. The Cold War helped and led the Western Allies to weaken their policy of “Ent-Nazifizierung” (de-nazification), since they were in need of a loyal ally in West Germany. The communists were identi- fied as the new culprits. The Soviet Union and the new commu- nist regimes in Eastern Europe were held responsible for the German suffering especially after the war. They were involved in the unsolved problem of the POWs, in the expulsion of the Germans from Eastem Europe, the soldiers of the Red army had raped German women and had plundered German cities and
12 Margalit, Divided Метогу? p. 33-36.
last but not least, the communists were responsible for the con- solidation of the German separation. As well as the official col- lective шетогу of the GDR, the establishment of the FRG renewed an old Nazi stereotype that had been very valid during the time of the Third Reich: Anti-Bolshevism.The political elite of the FRG strongly rejected апу idea of “collective German guilt” for the murder of the Jews. It is inte- resting to note that the Germans were always eager to deny the idea of “collective guilt”, while as Helmut Dubiel showed, nobody ever formulated this accusation. Dubiel concludes that this kind of “projection” is a form of unconscious acknowlegde- ment of guilt, while denying it.13
13 Dubiel, Helmut: Niemand ist frei von der Geschichte. Die nationalso- 
zialistische Herrschaft in den Debatten des Deutschen Bundestages, Miinchen 
1999. p. 71.
14 Quoted after: Margalit, Divided Метогу? p. 37.
The Holocaust was regarded as not committed by the Ger- mans, but it was “crimes committed in the name of the German people” as Konrad Adenauer had put it.14 The question of who had committed those crimes in the name of the German people was never answered. Guilty were the elites of Nazi Germany, but in a very limited understanding of the term elite, the SS and Hitler himself. It was only a narrow circle around Hitler and those convicted by the trials, who in a very abstract sense were guilty of a mass murder that involved thousands of perpetra- tors. This Nazi elite was seen as seperated from the German na- tion as a whole.In the collective memories of the GDR and the FRG, as su- perficial as they are sketched above, there stand out striking si- milarities. In both German states the official тетогу politics re- garding the questions of historical guilt were somehow a conti- nuation of the situation right after “Zero hour”. Both German states percieved their German inhabitants as victims of war and National Socialism. The Jews or the Holocaust were hardly ever 
mentioned. If those “unspeakable crimes” were refered to at all, they remained somehow abstract and unconcrete.In both states, stereotvpes of the епету of the Third Reich were transformcd into the new historical consciousness: Anti- Bolshevism in the FRG and anti-western attitude in the GDR. Always “the others” were guiltv. The shifting of guilt towards the “others” was used to stabilize and legitimize one 's own sta- te in contrast to thc other German state.
New impact on the collective тетогу: from the 1960s to 1989In the 1960ies the public discourse in West Germany was changing due to a generation shift. The academic elite who was reaching their historical chairs by the 1960s had been born in the 1930s and thus were not contemporaries but had lived in the Third Reich as children. In historical science and from the- re also in the public sphere it became possible to make the Na- zi past as well as the Holocaust a subject after a long time of si- lence. With a new generation appearing, the attitude towards the German past changed. More and more Germans came to ac- cepting a general German responsibility for the nazi crimes. But this feeling of responsibility remained abstract. Here Nicolas Berg’s observations fit into the picture. Historiography dealt with the history of the Third Reich, but the Holocaust itself somehow remained in the background.Starting with the early 1960s, West German historiography dealt with National Socialism in a scientific, non-moralistic man- ner. They tried to explain why the unspeakable crimes had hap- pened but they did not describe how they had happened. The Ho- locaust was always present in the works of the distinguished “Ze- ithistoriker”, such as Martin Broszat or Hans Mommsen, but it was present by absence. It was treated as a point of reference, but 
did not become the main subject of research. Therefore the “un- speakable crimes” remained abstract, in sciences as well as in the broader public.15 The 1960s were the time when the Germans, especially the young people, tumed against the personal continu- ities ffom the time of the Third Reich. They protested against the policy of “looking ahead” and demanded a reworking of the past. But most of those who rebelled against the older generation left out their own parents and tumed to an abstract “German guilt”. More than that, the Holocaust was not in the main focus in the public discussions about the nazi past in the 1960s.
15 See the brilliant analysis: Lorenz, Chris. Border-crossings: Some Re- 
flections on the Role of German Historians in Recent Public Debates on Nazi 
History. In: Michman, Rembering. p. 59-94. p. 71-76.
16 Broszat, Martin an Saul Friedlander, Miinchen, 26.10.1987. In: Vier- 
teljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 36 (1988) p. 348-353. p. 352.
It was in this social context, that the “Zeithistoriker” devo- ted themselves to questions about the structures of the nazi sta- te. While the intentionalists still concentrated on the intentions of a small nazi elite, the functionalists researched the structures of the Third Reich resulting in the “unspeakable crimes”. The structures leading to the Holocaust exculpated the individual, since the crimes had happened due to “cumulative radicaliza- tion” of the double structure (state and party) of the NS state. Under this circumstances, individual guilt became “negligible portions of guilt”, as Martin Broszat later claimed: “The need for a historical presentation of the magnitude and singulartity of the horrifying events of the destruction of the Jews that is comparable to its diabolical causation has come into conflict with historical treatments which demonstrate that the full mag- nitude of this crime was made up of a multitude of often very small contributing elements, and of frequently negligible porti- ons of guilt.”16This quotation is taken from the correspondence between Martin Broszat and Saul Friedlander, published in the “Vierte- ljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte” in 1988. Broszat’s thoughts abo- 
ut a historical method fit for a historiography of National Soci- alism have been notoriouslv quoted especiallv in the Berg deba- te. It is a verv tclling source though, even if written some 20 vears latcr, about the self-perception of the innovating “Zeithi- storiker”, who renevved thc discipline in the 1960ies and from thcn on dominated the discoursc on thc German past.It was in thc vcrv same context that Broszat claimed that historiographv about National Socialism should not center aro- und a perspective given by Holocaust, symbolized by the code “Auschwirz”: “The German historian, too, will certainly accept that Auschwitz - due to its singular significance - functions in rctrospection as the central event of the Nazi period. Yet qua scientist and scholar, he cannot readily accept that Ausschwitz also be made, after the fact, into the cardinal point, the hinge on which the entire factual complex of historical events of the Nazi period turns. He cannot simply accept without further ado that this entire complex of history be moved into the shadow of Auschwitz - yes, that Auschwitz even be made into the decisive measuring rod for the historical perception of this period. Such a perspective would not only serve after the fact, to force total- ly under its usurped domination those non-National Socialist German traditions which extended on into the Nazi period and, due to their being ’appropriated’ by the regime, to a certain extent themselves fell ргеу to National Socialism.”17
17 Ibidem, p. 353.
Looking back into the traditions of “remembering the Ho- locaust in Germany” it is striking, that Broszat, who turned over the way Germans thought about their nazi history and among others started off with a critical historical consciousness, holds Auschwitz against the “non-National Socialist German traditi- ons” that “fell ргеу to National Socialism”. He thus continues to a certain degree the relativization between Jewish and German victims, which was constantly present in апу attempt not to “re- member the Holocaust in Germany”.
Broszat also interestingly distinguishes the matter of the centrality of Auschwitz between himself “qua scientist and scholar” and the collective тетогу: “Auschwitz has in retro- spect rightfully been felt again and again indeed to be the cen- tral event of the Nazi period - and this not only by Jews. Consequently, Auschwitz also plays a central role in the West German historical treatment of the Nazi period - in school bo- oks, for example - as can be readily shown.”18
18 Ibidem, p. 352.
19 Der Spiegel, 29.1.1979.
It is true that in the 1980s the Holocaust was already a to- pic in public discourse. But not for too long. Starting with the political change in the latel960s, when the Social Democrats came into power, the political culture as well as the official col- lective тетогу underwent changes. Willy Brandt, who was known to have been an active Nazi opponent and who'had li- ved in exile during the war, became the first Social Democrate chancellor of the FRG. In 1970 he begged the victims of the Warsaw Ghetto pardon by his famous prostration in Warsaw. In 1977, his successor Helmut Schmidt visited Auschwitz as the first chancellor of the FRG. The greatest impact however had the mass media.With broadcasting the TV series “Holocaust” in 1979, not only the notion of Holocaust but also the topic became a part of popular culture.In Јапиагу 1979 the American TV series was broadcast in Germany after a heated discussion in the media about value and problems of a “commercialized” and fictional representa- tion of the genocide of the European Jews by mass media. The discussion started in the USA and continued in West Germany but the instant success of the series changed the reception. While, for example, the magazine “Der Spiegel” was critical in the beginning, two weeks after the broadcast it claimed on its front page: “Holocaust - The murder of the Jews is moving the Germans”.19 The TV series seemed to have really affected the 
German тетогу of the Holocaust. Between 43% and 48% of the German households watched the “Holocaust”, two thirds of them were “deeplv moved” by it. Those who watched it claimed that their knowlegde of the Holocaust had now greatly increa- sed. Especially younger and less educated viewers stated that they had not known very much about the Holocaust before the broadcast.20 From that time on, public awareness of the Holo- caust was increasing.
20 Wilke, Jiirgen: Die Femsehserie “Holocaust” als Medienereignis 
http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/md=FSHolocaust-Wilke 1. 04. 2004.
21 See Schirrmacher, Frank. Die Walser-Bubis Debatte. Eine Dokumen- 
tation. Frankfurt/Main 2000.
Remembering the Holocaust after the re-unification of GermanyFrom the 1980s on, the public taboo on discussing the Ho- locaust was decreasing. But after 1990, remembering the Holo- caust reached a new quality. The re-unification of Germany ra- ised suspicion among some of the former Allies that a new Germany would emerge without апу consciousness of Germany's dreadful history in the twentieth century. There were some indicators fostering this suspicion, as for example the scandal attached to the name of Martin Walser. The speech by the famous German author Martin Walser at the сегетопу for the Peace Award of the German bookselling trade in 1998 was only the peak of an ongoing discourse of unwillingness to remember the German guilt. Walser demanded an end of “the permanent representation of our blemish”. Even though there had never been such a “permanent representation”, some pro- minent Germans took his side. Ignaz Bubis, head of the “Zen- tralrat der Juden in Deutschland” at that time, was shocked and started with his public answer what was later called the “Walser-Bubis-Debate”.21
If we look at the history of remembering the Holocaust in Germany we will see that Martin Walser’s refusal to actively re- member the German guilt was not a singular scandal, reaching a new quality of historical oblivion, but rather proves the conti- nuities of German “Vergangenheitsbewaltigung”.Probably the scandalizing power of Walser’s speach was that heavy as in the 1990s, public awareness of “German guilt” and the Holocaust was bigger than it had ever been in German post-war history. The re-unification ended the “German cata- strophe” and thus effected the German public debate on the consequences of National Socialism. Germans had no need to feel as victims of their own history апу longer and were able to concentrate on the other victims. After the “German cata- strophe” had vanished there was only the ‘Jewish catastrophe” left. The German confrontation with the nazi legacy was steadi- ly increasing, as can be shown by the numerous debates of the 1990s, such as the “Goldhagen” and the “Wehrmacht” debate, to name but two of them.22
22 See Lorenz, Border-crossings, p. 76-81.
23 Goldhagen, Daniel Noah. Hitler’s willing executioners. Ordinary Ger- 
mans and the Holocaust, New York 1996.
The book by Daniel Noah Goldhagen, “Hitler’s willing ехе- cutioners. Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust”23 effectively raised, notwithstanding its scientific quality, a new question in German society: Who committed those “unspeakable crimes”?The same question was discussed in the “Wehrmacht” de- bate. It started with an exhibition of the “Hamburger Institut fur Sozialforschung” documenting the crimes committed by the German Wehrmacht soldiers against civilians in Eastem Europe, Jews among them. This exhibition, “Vemichtungskrieg. Die Ver- brechen der Wehrmacht in Osteuropa 1941-1944“, put an end to a common myth of German postwar society; the myth of the „saubere (clean) Wehrmacht“. Up to this point it had been a common belief that the war crimes as mass murder of civilians 
L
had bccn committed mostly by the SD or SS, while the German VVehrmacht had been cngaged in ,,normal“ tvarfare in Eastern Europc. The exhibition, by displaving photographs and letters from soldiers, that thc perpctrators had foremost been “ordi- пагу” Gcrman soldiers who had bccn at the scene of the crime at thc rimc of rhc crimc.24
24 See Heer, Hannes (Hg.) Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der 
Wehrmach 1941-1944, Hamburg 1995.
25 See f.e. Pohl, Dieter. Verfolgung und Massenmord in der NS-Zeit, 
Darmstadt 2003.
It is intcrcsting to notc that thosc debatcs were initiated outsidc thc Gcrman historical profession and that there were se- veral attcmpts from within the profession to discredit them. Using disciplinary arguments, finding vvrong sources and pro- ving that e. g. some of the photographs displayed by the “VVehrmacht” exibition had been interpreted incorrectly, Ger- man senior historians tried to convince the public that the given answer to the new question “who committed the ’unspeakable crimes’?” was entirely wrong.But still those debates fostered an historical consciousness about the Holocaust and the German guilt in a broader public, and within the historical profession in Germany there emerged a couple of scholars of a younger generation dealing with those questions on a high level of quality.25Albeit the seemingly success story of public тетогу of the Holocaust in Germany after the re-unification it should be kept in mind that in spite of democratization and liberalization of the German society after the war it took almost 50 years (two generations) before the society was able to stand the confronta- tion with German guilt. A “Vergangenheitsbewaltigung” in ot- her traumatized and “guilty” societies such as the post-soviet or the former Yugoslavian society should not be judged without that consideration.Regarding the continuities of “remembering the Holocaust in Germany” there is an interesting phenomena to note which 
should be kept in mind. Among school children and especially among those with higher education, the knowledge of the Holo- caust and about the history of Nazi Germany has become very high in Germany in recent years. But this historical consciousness of guilt remains abstract. A quantitative public opinion poll from June 2002 found out that while Germans know a lot about the Holocaust and National Socialism, almost nobody relates this knowledge to a personal guilt of his/her own parents and grand- parents. In the group with the highest education, 56% of the re- spondents were convinced that their parents or grandparents had been opponents to National Socialism and only 1% believed that their own family members had been involved in the “unspeaka- ble crimes”. To the contrary, 26% of the interviewed were certain that their parents and grandparents had “helped Jews”. Today's grandchildren again percieve their grandparents as victims. 71% think that “they suffered a lot during the war”.26
26 See Welzer, Harals; Moller, Sabine und Tschuggnall, Karoline: „Ора 
war kein Nazi“, Nationalsozialismus und Holocaust im Familiengedachtnis. 
Frankfurt/Main 2002, p. 246-248.
According to this poll, almost 60 years after the Holocaust there is still no feeling of апу “personal” form of guilt. While German society is ready to accept a general liability for the “Ho- locaust” there is still a tendency to avoid feeling guilty in a mo- re immediate sense. Instead, close relatives who lived during the war and the Holocaust are still percieved as victims of war and thus of National Socialism.The paradigms of “remembering the Holocaust in Germany” thus are irritatingly constant. The self-perception as victims, while blaming “the others”, emerged in “Zero Hour” and remained intact until today.This observation leads to the conclusion that it might be impossible for a group to deal with its own guilt. There seems to be no collective тетогу of crime. On the other hand the Ger- man example shows how closely linked modernization of soci- 
cty and the cstablishment of modern values are to outright and fair-minded historical consciousness without the avoidance of the dark chaptcrs of historv. Therefore, even if it seems to be impossible, we need a collective memorv of crime.
